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I. INTRODUCTION
In a speech given at Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland, on May
31, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush declared:
The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
And we must work together to stop proliferation .... When weapons of mass destruction
or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them.
t Lecturer in Law, University of Warwick School of Law; Senior Research Fellow,
University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security. The author wishes to thank Philip
Alston, Michael Byers, Maria Joyner, and Nigel White for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks
are also particularly expressed to Gregory Swartzberg for research assistance. An earlier draft of this
work was presented at the annual meeting of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
June 11, 2004.
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So today I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security
Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have
begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and
to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this
partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away
from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies.
The speech was given approximately five months after the U.S. Navy
had participated in an incident involving a North Korean merchant ship, which
was to serve as the catalyst for this significant change in U.S. policy related to
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
II. THE SO SAN
At dawn on Monday, December 9, 2002, two Spanish Navy ships, the
Navarra and the Patino, signaled the freighter So San, which was at the time
approximately 600 miles off the Yemeni coast in international waters. U.S.
intelligence satellites and Navy ships had been tracking the ship since it had
left the North Korean port of Nampo in mid-November. The ship was
registered in Cambodia but was sailing without a flag. When the freighter
attempted to evade capture, the Spanish ships fired warning shots, first into
the water in front of the ship and then across its bow. When the So San failed
to respond, a helicopter was dispatched carrying seven Spanish Special Forces• • 2
troops, who boarded the ships 
using fast ropes.
The crew of about twenty was put under guard, and the ship was
searched. It was evident that the ship's original name and identification
number had been painted over and equally clear that the ship was crewed by
North Koreans. The captain claimed that the last port of call had been China
and that the ship was transporting 2000 pounds of concrete to Yemen,
information verified by the ship's manifest. When Spanish troops began to
inspect the ship's cargo, however, they found, partially hidden by the 40,000
bags of cement also in the hold, large containers of missile parts and
additional containers of an unknown chemical. The captain of the Patino then
called in U.S. military explosives experts aboard the USS Nassau, who were
able to verify the items as composite parts of fifteen mid-range SCUD
missiles, with fifteen conventional warheads and eighty-five drums of a
chemical called inhibited red fuming nitric acid-used as an oxidizer in
SCUD missile fuel .
Then commenced a flurry of communiqu6s and phone calls through
which it was discovered that the ship was indeed headed for Yemen and that
the Yemeni government openly confirmed the order of the missile
components. It had apparently agreed to purchase them in 1999 to help
upgrade the small number of SCUD missiles it already possessed. Yemeni
1. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html (May 31, 2003).
2. See Thomas Ricks & Peter Slevin, Spain and U.S. Seize N. Korean Missiles, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 2002, at Al; Al Goodman et al., Scud Missiles Are Ours, Says Yemen, CNN.com, at
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/l2/1 /scud.ship/ (Dec. 11, 2002).
3. North Korea: U.S., Spanish Forces Seize Scud Shipment, NTI GLOBAL SECURITY
NEWSWmB, at http://www.nti.org/dnewswire/issues//2002/12/11/7p.html (Dec. 11, 2002).
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officials denied any intent to conceal the shipment, blaming the deceptive
storage underneath bags of cement on North Korea. Yemeni Foreign Minister
Abubakr al-Qirbi stated: "The shipment is part of contracts signed some time
ago .... It belongs to the Yemeni government and its army and is meant for
defensive purposes."4 Al-Qirbi summoned the U.S. ambassador to the capital
of Sanaa to lodge a formal protest over the seizure of the shipment.5
For the next two days, Washington officials debated a course of action in
light of the discovery and of the Yemeni government's claim of right. After
consulting with key foreign-policy makers as well as lawyers at the State
Department and elsewhere, President Bush signed off on the decision to
release the ship and its cargo. Speaking at a luncheon in Washington on
December 11, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated:
[A]fter getting assurances directly from the President of Yemen, President Salih, that this
was the last of a group of shipments that go back some years and had been contracted for
some years ago, this would be the end of it and we had assurances that these missiles
were for Yemeni defensive purposes and under no circumstances would they be going
anywhere else. And on that basis, and also in acknowledgement of the fact that it was on
international water and it was a sale that was out in the open and consistent with
international law, a little while ago we directed the ship to continue to its destination.
6And I conveyed that to the President of Yemen just a little while ago.
III. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
In the aftermath of these events, head-scratching ensued in Washington,
as the full import of what had just happened became disturbingly clear. Here
had been a ship from North Korea--commonly thought to be the worst
proliferator of missile technology-found conclusively to be transporting a
cargo of concealed missile components capable of being assembled and armed
with warheads carrying any one of a number of dangerous chemicals,
biological agents, or even nuclear weapons, on its way to a region of the world
at the top of Washington's worry list. Yet when action was taken to seize the
weapons and prevent their delivery, it was discovered that there was no
justification under international law for doing so. There was in fact nothing
illegal going on-no treaties were violated. In the eyes of existing law, it was
simply a sale of goods from one state to another, and, if anything, the Spanish
and U.S. ships involved in the forced inspection had arguably crossed over a
legal line in abridging the So San's right to free passage through international
waters. There was a common consensus among senior U.S. officials,
particularly at the Department of Defense, that this was simply an
unacceptable status quo and that something had to be done.7
Thus was born the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), through which,
according to then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton, the United States
expressed its hope to
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks at the American Academy of Diplomacy
Annual Awards Presentation Luncheon, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/-
15887.htm (Dec. 11, 2002).
7. Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 526, 527-28 (2004).
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work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade
at sea, in the air, and on land. The initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic,
proactive approach to the global proliferation problem. It envisions partnerships of states
working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of
legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of
WMiD- and missile-related equipment and technologies.
8
After President Bush's announcement of the initiative in May 2003,
meetings were held in the summer of 2003 in Brisbane and Madrid. Australia
and Spain were among the eleven states initially signing on as members of the
"small core group of countries" taking up this U.S.-led initiative-Australia,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.9 By September, the group had moved
on to conducting collaborative exercises, in which mock interdictions were
staged by ships and troops from various member nations working in concert.
On September 4, the White House issued the Statement of Interdiction
Principles, which outlined the joint commitment of PSI members and invited
other similarly minded states likewise to commit to "[u]ndertake effective
measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the
transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern." 0 The Statement
of Interdiction Principles lays out in some detail the "actions in support of
interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or
related materials" that PSI members and participants are contemplated to
undertake. 11
Plans have been made to increase the complexity and broaden the scope
of these exercises, with future mock interdictions to take place in areas of the
world most highly trafficked by traders and smugglers of WvMD-related
materials-notably in the Mediterranean and Arabian seas and the Pacific
Ocean. Then-Under Secretary of State Bolton has confirmed that interdictions
under the PSI framework have already occurred with more to follow,
explaining that most such interdictions will not be made known to the public
out of concern for the ongoing effectiveness of the program.
12
However, the solidarity of this coalition of the willing has begun to be
shaken as the commonly agreed general principles at the heart of the PSI
become operationalized. Officials in a number of national capitals as well as
nongovernmental members of the international community have become more
aware and concerned about the questionable existence of an international legal
8. US. Efforts To Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Testimony Before the
House Comm. on Int ' Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security).
9. Acronym Inst. for Disarmament Diplomacy, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Meeting, Brisbane, July 9-10, at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/docO4.htm (last visited Apr. 20,
2005).
10. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Proliferation
Security Initiative, Statement of Interdiction Principles, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/-
2003!09/print/20030904-1 I.html (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release, Statement of Interdiction
Principles].
11. Id.
12. Wade Boese & Miles Pomper, The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with
John Bolton, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 11, 2003, at 37, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/-
act/2003_12/PSI.asp.
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basis on which to legitimize interdictions of merchant ships and aircraft
operating in sea zones in which national authority is not absolute.
1 3
This Article will examine these concerns and provide an analysis of
relevant international legal frameworks, specifically those concerning the
international law of the sea and the law regulating international uses of force.
It will also provide commentary on the utility of the PSI as a part of
international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD-related technologies
and materials. Before commencing this discussion, however, it is preliminarily
important to locate the PSI within the broader context of national and
multilateral efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
IV. NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION
A. Weapons of Mass Destruction
With the detonation of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945, the world was changed forever, and the international community
entered a new era heralded and defined by technological advances that were to
have revolutionary implications for the international and domestic security
environment. 14 These new technologies, some entirely unprecedented and
others simply increasing the effectiveness of older destructive technologies,
would fundamentally alter strategic calculations regarding uses of force, both
aggressive and defensive, and understandings of the power projection
capabilities of states and non-state actors.
These marked changes to the character of international security were
brought about through the development by a number of states in the closing
months of World War II, and increasingly in its aftermath, of weapons the
destructive capabilities of which required the new and separate nomenclature
of "weapons of mass destruction" to distinguish them from the weapons
conventionally in use before that time. Under this heading came to be grouped
instruments derived from certain uses of nuclear fissionable materials,
poisonous chemical compounds, and biological agents the destructive
capacities of which compressed the amount of time and effort required to kill
massive numbers of people through much more indiscriminate means than had
previously been possible.
15
The acquisition of such weapons by an increasing number of states in
various regions of the world was disconcerting to the most powerful members
of the international community-not only due to the distant possibilities of the
use of such weapons against them in an aggressive fashion, but also as it
became clear that the latent utility of these weapons itself had fundamentally
altered the strategic calculus employed in the former days of what came to be
known as conventional weapons. Under this previous calculus, the ability of
an international actor to wield and to project power could be derived through a
fairly simple assessment of the physical and territorial resources of that actor.
13. Michael Evans, US Plans To Seize Suspects at Will, TIMES (London), July 11, 2003, at 23.
14. See, e.g., NAOMI SHONO, THE LEGACY OF HIROSHIMA: ITS PAST, OUR FUTURE (1986).
15. See RANDALL FORSBERG ET AL., NONPROLIFERATION PRIMER: PREVENTING THE SPREAD
OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 12-13 (1995).
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Now, however, it became possible for smaller states and even some non-state
actors to change this security dynamic through the possession and threat of
using WMD. Through these means, international actors with relatively small
resource bases could gain useful leveraging and deterrent capabilities, wholly
disproportionate to their conventional military arsenals, against a larger state
or group of states.16
B. Nonproliferation
1. Treaties
During the period of East-West superpower rivalry that came to be
known as the Cold War, while on one level there was almost unbridled
development of WMD programs and production and operational fielding of
the most lethal WMD systems ever seen by the superpowers, there were
concurrently at another level significant efforts involving those actors as well
as other members of the international community to limit the proliferation of
WMD outside of a very select group. 17 The clearest example of this effort is
found in the nuclear weapons area, particularly in the advent of the Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
or NPT) in 1970, which forms the cornerstone of the modem multilateral
nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
18
The NPT was signed after twenty-five years of Cold War tensions for
several purposes: to provide a normative basis for the coordination of peaceful
uses of nuclear technology; to encourage international efforts of both
disarmament and decommissioning of existing nuclear stockpiles; and to
prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT's provisions
established two classes of state signatories. Article I obligated the five
acknowledged nuclear weapon states (China, France, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and the United Kingdom) not to transfer nuclear weapons, other
nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any recipient state not of
their number and prohibited them "in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices." 19 Non-nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT
obligated themselves under Article II not to acquire from any other state, or to
16. Id. at 19-23.
17. See generally JULIE DAHLITZ, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS (1983); INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL (Coit D. Blacker & Gloria Duffy eds., 2d ed.
1984); JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS (2d ed.
2002); NON-PROLIFERATION: THE WHY AND THE WHEREFORE (Jozef Goldblat ed., 1985); NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (M.P. Fry et al. eds., 1990); REGIONAL
APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT (Jayantha Dhanapala ed., 1993); 1 J.P. ROBINSON, THE PROBLEM OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1971); Barry Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of
Catastrophic Weaponry, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 755 (1994).
18. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. For an in-depth discussion of the NPT and its
historical context, see THE FUTURE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (John Simpson & Darryl
Howlett eds., 1995); GOLDBLAT, supra note 17, chs. 4-6; JOZEF GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (1990).
19. NPT, supra note 18, art. I.
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produce on their own, nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and not
to receive foreign assistance in weapon development programs. Currently, 189
20states are signatories to the NPT.
In the context of chemical and biological weapons as well, there
emerged during this era and afterward multilateral legal instruments
addressing both the proliferation and, in more absolute terms, the development
and possession of related materials and technologies. Building from the 1925
Geneva Protocol, which addressed the use of chemical and biological agents
in war, 21 the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC) banned the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition by other means, or retention
of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, as well as of weapons,
equipment, and means of delivery designed to use such agents and toxins for
hostile purposes in armed conflict.22 It further prohibited the transfer of such
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery to "any recipient
whatsoever." 23 Unlike the NPT, however, the BWC does not separate states
party into categories, with some having privileges of retention that others lack.
Like the NPT, the BWC is a multilateral disarmament and
nonproliferation treaty that addresses both vertical (intrastate) and horizontal
(interstate) proliferation. While it does include a commitment to engage in
"the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information" regarding biological agents, toxins, and equipment
for the processing, use, and production of such agents, 24 its prohibition on
transfers is controlling. In terms of disarmament, the BWC's central and most
remarkable feature is the blanket requirement that all parties destroy or divert
to peaceful purposes (such as non-military scientific research) all biological
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery no later than nine
months after the entry into force of the convention or the party's later
accession.
25
Similarly, following the 1990 U.S.-Soviet Chemical Weapons
Agreement-which provided for a bilateral halt to the production of chemical
weapons, a reduction of chemical weapon stockpiles to equal, low levels, and
for a mechanism to verify compliance 26 -and building upon a number of
other regional initiatives, the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention
20. Arms Control Ass'n, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a Glance, at
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact.asp (Apr. 2005).
21. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Apr.
10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
23. Id. art. III.
24. Id. art. X(1).
25. Id. art. X(2).
26. Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures
To Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
arts. I-V, 29 I.L.M. 932, 934-38 (1992).
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(CWC) was opened for signature in January 1993.27 The CWC prohibits all
signatories from the development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling,
retention, or transfer to anyone of weapon-grade toxic chemicals and their
precursors, except where intended (as shown through consistent types and
quantities) for non-prohibited peaceful purposes such as industry, agriculture,
medicine, and related research. 28 To implement the provisions of the CWC,
toxic chemicals and their precursors are listed in three attached schedules
corresponding to the level of concern applicable to them and detailing their
respective destruction and transfer requirements.29 States party are further
obligated to enact national laws prohibiting natural or legal persons anywhere
in their territory, elsewhere under their jurisdiction, or of their nationality
from undertaking any activity prohibited to a state party.
30
2. Safeguards and Export Controls
Recognizing the characteristic (and politically necessary) vagueness and
non-specificity of these binding multilateral legal instruments, further related
efforts at nonproliferation have included supplementary mechanisms for
verifying compliance with treaty obligations and for coordinating and
harmonizing national export control laws and policies. Article III of the NPT,
for example, explicitly provides for these additional mechanisms. Under
Article 111(1), non-nuclear weapon states are required to accept the imposition
of safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to verify compliance with the provisions of the NPT and specifically
to detect diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful uses, such as civilian
power generation, to the production of nuclear weapons. 31 Under Article
111(1), each non-nuclear weapon state agrees to conclude an independent
bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the terms of these
27. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 21 (1993), 1974
U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC]. For more information on the CWC, see generally THOMAS BERNAUER,
THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (1990); HERBICIDES IN WAR: THE LONG-TERM ECOLOGICAL AND
HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984); MALVERN LUMSDEN, INCENDIARY WEAPONS
72-73 (1975).
28. CWC, supra note 27, arts. I(1)(a), II(1)(a), H(9).
29. Id. app. B.
30. Id. art. VH(). In addition to these instruments, during this era and up to the present, a
complex web of treaties and agreements has been concluded to address in a more targeted fashion
vertical proliferation through measures of strategic arms control and limitation. For notable examples of
such agreements in the nuclear context, see Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russ., S. TREATY
Doc. NO. 107-8 (2002); Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(START 11), Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-1 (1993); Treaty on Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START 1), July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY DOC. No.
102-20 (1992); Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II),
June 19, 1979, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. EXEC. DOC. Y, 96-1 (1979); Interim Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), May 26, 1972, U.S.- U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462.
31. NPT, supra note 18, art. III(l). On safeguards, see generally FRANK BARNABY ET AL.,
NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION (1979); DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS (1997); DAVID FISCHER & PAUL
SZASZ, SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1985).
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safeguards agreements, all nuclear materials put to peaceful use at civilian
facilities within the jurisdiction of the non-nuclear weapon state must be
declared to the IAEA, whose inspectors are to be given regular access to the
facilities for purposes of monitoring and inspections. Because of its
comprehensive character, this NPT structure is referred to as the Full Scope
Safeguards System. 32 Compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements is
verified under this inspection scheme, and reports are submitted to the IAEA
Board of Governors. If that body determines that there has been a breach
either of a safeguards agreement or of the provisions of the NPT itself, it can,
in accordance with its statutory procedures, refer the matter to the U.N.
Security Council for that body's deliberation, action, and potential
authorization of measures to remedy the breach, including at the extreme the
use of the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
33
Article 111(2) of the NPT provides the international legal basis for all
nuclear export controls. 34 It specifies that parties to the treaty will not transfer
nuclear (fissionable) materials, or any "equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material," to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes
unless such material is subject to the safeguards specified in Article III(l).
3
1
Although not formally a part of the NPT treaty regime, shortly after the NPT
entered into force a group of NPT-signatory supplier states and potential
supplier states of nuclear materials gathered to clarify the technical
implications of NPT export controls as well as to establish a continuing forum
for the interpretation of Article III(2)'s broad export control provisions. The
participants at this meeting formed the nucleus of a group that came to be
known as the Zangger Committee.3 6 The Zangger Committee continued to
meet periodically and eventually established both a set of understandings
adopted by all committee members, and a "Trigger List" composed of items
the export of which should trigger the requirement of safeguards.
37
32. See Fritz Schmidt, NPT Export Controls and the Zangger Committee, NONPROLIFERATION
REV., Fall-Winter 2000, at 136, 137.
33. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art. HI(b), 8 U.S.T.
1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
34. On the role that export controls can play in nonproliferation efforts and on their
limitations, see generally GARY K. BERTSCH & SuzETrE GRILLOT, ARMS ON THE MARKET: REDUCING
THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (1998); PETER VAN HAM, MANAGING NON-
PROLIFERATION REGIMES IN THE 1990S: POWER, POLITICS AND POLICIES (1994); ERIC H. NOEHRENBERG,
MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORY: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
COCOM (1995); Kathleen Bailey, Nonproliferation Export Controls: Problems and Alternatives, in
PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROLS (Kathleen Bailey & Robert Rudney eds., 1993); David S.
Gualtieri, The System of Non-proliferation Export Controls, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE
ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000);
Richard Cupitt & Suzette Grillot, COCOM Is Dead, Long Live COCOM: Persistence and Change in
Multilateral Security Institutions, 27 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 361 (1997); Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuring the
Multilateral Export Control Regime System, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 181 (2004); Michael Lipson,
The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls, NONPROLIFERATION REV.,
Winter 1999, at 33.
35. NPT, supra note 18, art. 11](2).
36. See generally Schmidt, supra note 32; Fritz Schmidt, The Zangger Committee: Its History
and Future Role, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1994, at 38; CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,
Zangger Committee (ZA C), in INVENTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ORGANIZATIONS AND
REGIMES (2002), available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/official-docs/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdf.
37. CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, supra note 36.
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The explosion of a nuclear device by India in May 1974, in addition to
increased activity among other non-nuclear weapon states to create a full
nuclear fuel cycle, led to heightened concern among supplier states regarding
nuclear proliferation. 38 In 1975, a new group of supplier states met in London
with the purpose of supplementing the Zangger Committee's work in the field
of nuclear export controls. Over successive meetings, this group became
known unofficially as the London Club and officially as the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG).39
In 1976, NSG member states produced a document entitled Guidelines
on Nuclear Transfers, which was accepted by all fifteen members in 1977 and
published in February 1978. The NSG guidelines incorporated the Zangger
Committee's trigger list and largely mirrored the committee's understandings.
The document also went beyond the context of the NPT to cover nuclear
transfers to any non-nuclear weapon state.40
In 1992, the NSG produced a supplementary regime for the coordination
and harmonization of national export controls on dual-use items-those
materials and technologies with both legitimate commercial and potential
WMD-related uses. The group felt an imperative to take this step after it
became clear that one of the greatest facilitators of the formidable yet
clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons program was the importation, through
various methods ranging from open purchase to covert indirect acquisition, of
dual-use items from Western companies. 41 This arrangement was formally
adopted by the what had by then grown to twenty-seven NSG members at
their 1992 plenary meeting in Warsaw, and both the resulting guidelines and
trigger list were published by the IAEA in July 2002.42
A comparable system of safeguards and a multilateral export control
regime exists in the chemical weapons area, coordinated through and
monitored by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
the Australia Group, with the Australia Group covering under its mandate the
coordination and harmonization of national export controls in the areas of
both chemical and biological weapons-related materials.43
3. Delivery Means
It is significant to note in this context that-as U.S. officials discovered
to their dismay upon consultation with their lawyers in the So San case-there
is no multilateral treaty regulating the possession, development, or trade of
38. See Tadeusz Strulak, The Nuclear Suppliers Group, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1993,
at 2; Nuclear Suppliers Group, History of the NSG, at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/history.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
39. Strulak, supra note 38, at 2.
40. Id. at 3.
41. David Albright & Mark Hibbs, Iraq"s Shop-Till-You-Drop Nuclear Program?, BULL. OF
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1992, at 26-37; David A. Kay, Denial and Deception of WMD Proliferators:
Iraq and Beyond, WASH. Q., Nov. 1994, at 85, 90; James Holmes & Gary Bertsch, Tighten Export
Controls: Loose Standards Will Breed New Saddams, DEFENSE NEWS, at http://www.defensenews.com/-
sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20030505/atpc4401624.sgml (May 5, 2003).
42. See Daniel H. Joyner, The Nuclear Suppliers Group: History and Functioning, 10 INT'L
TRADE L. & REG. (forthcoming 2005).
43. GOLDBLAT, supra note 17, at 142-43, 149, 323-24, 330-31.
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missile technologies. Such technologies, in addition to their capacities for
carrying conventional weapon payloads, are relevant to WMD regulation as
the most strategically useful and lethal means of delivery of many WMD
systems. This particular area has always bedeviled and resisted efforts at
multilateral normative regulation, due largely to the fact that missile
technologies are by far the most dual-use in character among all WMD-related
technologies. 44 Missile components-unlike, for example, nuclear weapon-
grade fissile materials-have many legitimate civilian uses quite apart from
their military uses, many of which are themselves widely considered to be
legitimate. These uses include, most importantly, peaceful space exploration
and development programs. 45 To add to the difficulty, there is virtually no
means available to distinguish between a civilian space missile program and a
military missile program until the very late stages of its development. Thus
normative progression in this area has been effectively stalled over difficulties
in addressing the specific technologies involved by means of formally binding
instruments due to the inability of such instruments to distinguish effectively
between legitimate materials and technologies and those that should be subject
to regulation in this rapidly changing technological landscape.46
However, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was
founded as a non-binding political arrangement in 1987 for the purpose of
controlling the proliferation of rocket and unmanned air vehicle systems
capable of delivering WMD and their associated materials and technology. Its
membership currently stands at thirty-three countries that use the MTCR as a
forum for the coordination of export control measures specifically related to
the two categories of missile-related items contained in the MTCR annex. Its
intended goal is to restrict exports of these sensitive items and therefore
inhibit their proliferation outside the boundaries of MTCR membership.
47
At the fifteenth plenary meeting of MTCR member states in October
2000, a draft International Code of Conduct generating demand-side norms
was circulated and discussed, and by April 2002, eighty countries had
purportedly agreed on a draft of the code at a meeting in Paris. The draft code
was to contain a recitation of agreed-upon principles, commitments,
44. See id. at 346-48; see also AARON KARP, BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION: THE
POLITICS AND TECHNICS 52-56 (1996) (observing that "[b]y its very nature, rocket technology is equally
suitable for civilian and military applications"); Wyn Bowen, US. Policy on Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997), NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1997, at 21, 23
(recognizing the possibility of a "diversion of [missile] technology" from civilian to military uses);
Deborah A. Ozga, A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime, NONPROLIFERATION REV.,
Winter 1994, at 66, 67 (noting that the Missile Technology Control Regime permits sales of dual-use
technology so long as recipient states furnish "sufficient end-use guarantees").
45. PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991).
46. See Victor Zaborsky, Missile Proliferation Risks of International Space Cooperation, 165
WORLD AFF. 185, 194 (2003) ("From the technical and technological point of view [one can] never
develop a 'threshold' that would divide 'safe' civilian transfers . . . from exports used in a weapon
program."); see also Mark Smith, Rules for the Road? The International Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 10, available at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op3.htm (difficult to set international norms for missile control
due to perceived discrimination).
47. GOLDBLAT, supra note 17, at 122-24.
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incentives for compliance, and confidence-building measures.48 While the
commitments were carefully worded so as to avoid the attachment of legal
obligations to their terms, they did include commitments by signatory states to
ratify a number of international treaties on space exploration, to undertake
measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD-capable missiles, to reduce
national holdings of the same, to exercise vigilance in the consideration of
assistance to space-launch vehicle programs in other countries (a notorious
front for military-use missile and WMD-delivery system programs), and not
to support ballistic missile programs in countries that "might be developing or
acquiring weapons of mass destruction in contravention of the obligations
under, and norms established by, the disarmament and non-proliferation
treaties." 49 The resulting Hague International Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation has since come into force as a non-binding
arrangement among its ninety declarants.
50
C. Counterproliferation
Notwithstanding all the effort and resources expended by the
international community in concluding and maintaining these treaties and
other normative regimes, along with their significant utility in accomplishing
the nonproliferation of WMD and related materials and technologies, serious
students of WMD proliferation have long understood that the nonproliferation
regime they comprise is not a perfect system and was never designed or
expected to bring about a zero proliferation reality. Borders are too porous,
corruption at both high and low levels is too rampant in places where WMD
materials and technologies are already insufficiently secure, and both
legitimate commercial and illicit trafficking in WMD-related and dual-use
items and technologies are too big a business for states to hope to control it
completely and effectively through state-to-state treaties and supply-side
export control regimes. Adding to the difficulties faced by the international
community in efforts to prevent proliferation through multilateral normative
regimes is the increasing phenomenon of secondary proliferation, or
proliferation from non-traditional supplier states, many of which remain
outside the existing regime structures.
Indeed, leakages and transfers to places and groups of concern to many
powerful countries, both of materials and of intangible technological know-
how, are disturbingly commonplace. There are currently nine declared or
suspected nuclear weapon states and many more states that possess chemical
and biological weapons; a number of others are suspected of having mature
clandestine weapon development programs. 51 When U.N. inspectors entered
48. See Smith, supra note 46.
49. Draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation § (b)(5)
(2002), http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/drafticoc.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
50. International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002),
http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/hcocfinal.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
51. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been officially
recognized as possessing nuclear weapons. States widely believed to possess nuclear arsenals are India,
Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Iran is suspected of undertaking an active program to produce nuclear
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Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, they found a covert WMD program of
staggering proportions, the development of which, as previously noted, had
been significantly facilitated by dual-use goods obtained from Western
companies, in many cases through transactions that were arguably legal under
national export control laws.
52
Concerns flowing from the reality of WMD proliferation have been
aggravated in recent years due to the emergence of state actors as well as
sophisticated and maturing groups of non-state actors with both the resource
base and either the ideological or the strategic incentive to acquire and
contemplate the use of WMD for the accomplishment of objectives perceived
by many of the most powerful members of the international community as
inimical to international peace and security. The rise to prominence and
capability of complex and well-funded crossborder organizations-the
practices of which include the use of terroristic and violent actions calculated
to bring about desired objectives grounded in what are alleged by their
intended victims to be non-rational ideologies-that are suspected of having
access to or being in the process of developing WMD has in recent years
formed a threat nexus continually on the lips of international officials.53
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a number of voices in the
international community, particularly from states that feel especially
threatened by and vulnerable to WMD attacks staged by the aforementioned
variety of ideology-driven non-state actors, have called for a refocusing of
attention and lesser reliance on the traditional treaties and regimes approach to
stemming the proliferation of WMD. These commentators point to the
previously described limitations of classical nonproliferation efforts and argue
that, either as a supplement to or as a replacement of this system of diplomatic
relations and normative multilateral frameworks, states should increase their
emphasis on and employment of proactive and forceful efforts of
counterproliferation, including the use of both preemptive and preventive
strategies for dealing with potential threats of WMD proliferation and use.
54
A word on definition is in order. The terms nonproliferation and
counterproliferation, as used herein and elsewhere in the literature on WMD
proliferation, represent attempts to give some categorization to a variety of
often-interlinked concepts and policies. In this sense, the distinction may
rightly be challenged as largely arbitrary and semantic. However, the purpose
of this categorization is essentially to recognize sometimes subtle (and
sometimes not-so-subtle) differences in both methodology and purpose found
weapons. Arms Control Ass'n, Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, at
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.asp (Apr. 2005).
52. See Albright & Hibbs, supra note 41; Holmes & Bertsch, supra note 41.
53. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373 are examples of heightened
international concern. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1540
(2004); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
54. See Jason D. Ellis, The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security,
WASH. Q., Spring 2003, at 115 (noting that "the best defense against proliferation and terrorism is a
good offense"); see also JASON D. ELLIS & GEOFFREY D. KIEFER, COMBATING PROLIFERATION:
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY POLICY 192-214 (2004); Brad Roberts, Proliferation and
Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Looking for the Right Lessons, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1999, at
70, 72 (noting that counterproliferation is "an essential new tool of policy, one made necessary by the
fact that nonproliferation and arms control have not fully prevented proliferation").
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in the policies and philosophies of various policymakers relative to WMD
proliferation. Thus nonproliferation activities may be broadly described as
efforts calculated-if not always perfectly or effectively implemented-to
slow the proliferation of WMD-related technologies and preferably to effect a
reversal of proliferation trends through requiring the disarmament of existing
material stockpiles. Activities under this category include possession and
proliferation treaties, safeguards and inspection regimes, export control
regimes, export control assistance measures, and economic sanctions.
Counterproliferation activities may be broadly defined as efforts either
to preclude specific actors from obtaining WMD-related materials and
technologies, or to degrade and destroy an actor's existing WvMD capability.
The blurry distinction between the two concepts is made clearer through a
listing of activities usually classified as counterproliferation, in juxtaposition
to the treaties and regimes frameworks described previously. Under the
heading of counterproliferation activities can be grouped traditional efforts of
deterrence and containment, efforts of defense and mitigation of attack, use of
early detection technologies, interdiction of suspected transfers of sensitive
items, and preemptive and preventive acts of force against either actual or
potential possessors of WMD.
As is evident from the listing of activities subsumed under the two
headings, neither is a newcomer to policy circles, and both varieties of
activities have been carried out, to greater or lesser extent, for many years
through both national and international efforts. However, there is substantial
evidence to support the assertion that the call of the aforementioned
counterproliferation advocates has been heard. Particularly in the policy
positions of the United States and some other powerful states, the momentum
has begun to swing toward an increased emphasis on proactive and often
unilateral or small-coalition-based counterproliferation activities, and away
from nonproliferation efforts based on diplomacy and international law."
5
In both the September 2002 National Security Strategy and the
December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
U.S. policymakers have signaled a significant shift in WMD-related policies
toward counterproliferation principles. As stated in the latter document:
We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and
containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists ....
Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating
consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military
forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against
WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.
5 6
This document, interestingly, mentions counterproliferation techniques
first and includes an exhaustive explanation of policies to be pursued with
55. See Ellis, supra note 54, at 116-17.
56. NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 2-3 (2002), available
at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002l2/WMDStrategy.pdf.
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regard to interdiction, deterrence and defense, and mitigation. The National
Security Strategy discusses the concept of preemption further:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile attacks by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively.
... [I]n an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's
most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers
gather.
57
As Jason Ellis has succinctly written:
[T]he rise of counterproliferation to national stature really begins with the current
administration ....
. . . The Bush version gives continued importance to "strengthened" nonproliferation
efforts but downgrades the prior treaties-and-regimes approach, elevating the status of
proactive counterproliferation efforts to deter and defend against WMD and missile
threats as well as effective consequence management should such weapons be used.
58
The PSI is part of this resetting of emphasis in the United States and in a
limited number of other countries to favor counterproliferation efforts. It is
closely akin to what has become known as preemption policy, as iterated inter
alia in the above-mentioned U.S. policy documents. 59 Both the PSI and
preemption policy more generally share the classic, broad nonproliferation
aim of preventing the development and use of WMD; yet they differ from
traditional nonproliferation approaches in that they prescribe action in
situations in which that use is not an imminent reality but rather is perceived




This distinction and emphasis on anticipatory activity instead of
preventive normativity-the very appeal to counterproliferation proponents-
make both the general policy of preemption and the particular strategies
embodied in the PSI a focus of concern for international lawyers.61 It is to
57. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
58. Ellis, supra note 54, at 116-17.
59. See Robert S. Litwak, The New Calculus of Pre-emption, SURVIVAL, Winter 2002, at 53.
60. The 2002 National Security Strategy argues for a changed conception of the principle of
imminence in light of the "capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 57, at 15.
61. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 702 (6th ed. 2003);
Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J.
POL. PHIL. 171 (2003); Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97
AM. J. INT'L. L. 590 (2003).
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these legal concerns that this Article now turns. Since self-defense has been
offered as one justificatory rubric for not only preemptive action in the
broader sense but also for the PSI specifically,62 this Section will proceed to
consider briefly the contours of the modem right of self-defense, particularly
as it bears upon the use of force by states against other states before an attack
by the target state has commenced.
A review of the principles of law currently governing international uses
of force reveals a significant legal distinction between two categories of
actions and related justificatory rubrics often discussed under the heading of
preemption. Properly distinguished, these categories are anticipatory self-
defense and preventive self-defense.
63
Anticipatory self-defense may be defined as an attack on a state that
actively threatens violence and has the capacity to carry out that threat, but
which has not yet materialized or actualized that threat through force.
Anticipatory self-defense has a solid historical foundation in international law
as a principle developed in state practice throughout the classical period, and
it was originally an extension of states' understanding of their right to self-
preservation. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the right of
anticipatory self-defense as a matter of customary international law had been
circumscribed by at least two important limiting principles-necessity and
proportionality.
The correspondence between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and
British officials during the famous Caroline incident is widely understood as
offering a correct iteration of customary international law pertaining at the
time:
Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (April 24, 1841)
It will be for... [Her Majesty's) Government to show a necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for
it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the
moment authorised them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must
be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
65
Ian Brownlie has suggested that state practice between 1841 and 1945
served to limit the flexibility of the principle of anticipatory self-defense even
further, leaving it in a tenuous state of existence at the time the U.N. Charter
62. Greg Sheridan, US "Free" to Tackle N Korea, THE AUSTRALIAN, July 9, 2003, at 1.
63. See ANTHONY AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 71-79 (1993); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 257-59 (1963); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 111-15 (2000).
64. See BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 257.
65. THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-1843, at 43 (Kenneth E.
Shewmaker et al. eds., 1983). The Caroline was a U.S.-registered steamer hired to ferry provisions
across the Niagara River to supply Canadian rebels taking part in the insurrection against British
colonial rule in 1837. On December 29, 1837, several boatloads of British soldiers came across the river
onto the U.S. side and set fire to the Caroline, dragged her into the river current, and sent her blazing
over Niagara Falls, killing one man in the process. The ensuing diplomatic correspondence between U.S.
and U.K. officials has come to be regarded as a reliable statement of contemporary customary
international law on self-defense. For discussion of the Caroline incident, see WILLIAM BISHOP,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 916-17 (3d ed. 1971).
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66
was drafted. This position would seem to be supported through even more
recent events, such as the 1981 preemptive attack by Israel against a suspected
Iraqi nuclear weapons site at Osirak. Resolution 487 of the U.N. Security
Council, which was adopted unanimously, denounced the incident as a "clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations" notwithstanding Israel's
believable (and later validated) claim regarding Iraq's clandestine WMD
program and its connection to the site.
67
For signatories of the U.N. Charter, resort to a right of anticipatory self-
defense must be seen as highly questionable in light of the plain meaning of
the text of Article 5168 of that document.69 Nevertheless, some have contended
that the "inherent right" language in Article 51 has worked a retention of the
rights of self-defense operable under pre-Charter customary law for U.N.
Charter signatories. 70 This is a plausible position, but in the final analysis it
66. BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 702.
67. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981); see
also Louis Rene Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "Sorry" Seems To Be the Hardest Word, JERUSALEM
POST, June 5, 2003, at B8.
68. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
69. [W]here the Charter has a specific provision relating to a particular legal category,
to assert that this does not restrict the wider ambit of the customary law relating to that
category or problem is to go beyond the bounds of logic. Why have treaty provisions at
all? ... It is submitted that a restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the Charter
relating to the use of force would be more justifiable and that even as a matter of "plain"
interpretation the permission in Article 51 is exceptional in the context of the Charter and
exclusive of any customary right of self-defence.
BROWNLIE, supra note 63 at 273; see also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
803-04 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002); AHMED RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF
THE LEGAL CONCEPT; ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-27 (1979). The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifies that the plain (ordinary) meaning of a treaty
provision, in context and in light of its object and purpose, should be given preeminence in
interpretation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 321,
340. Article 32(b) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that supplementary means of interpretation,
including preparatory work on the treaty, can be employed only when the foregoing analysis of ordinary
meaning leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable." Id. art. 32(b).
70. It is ...fallacious to assume that members have only those rights which the
Charter accords to them; on the contrary they have those rights which general
international law accords to them except in so far as they have surrendered them under
the Charter .... [T]he view of Committee I at San Francisco was that this prohibition
[Article 2(4)] left the right of self-defense unimpaired.
DEREK BOwETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (1958); see also Steven Schwebel,
Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L'ACADtME DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE 411, 478-83 (1972). Although addressing a different
substantive question at the time, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 1986 Military and
Paramilitary Activities decision, held:
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a "natural" or
"inherent" right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a
customary nature .... Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of
this right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it
does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures
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does little to help those wishing to justify a broad preemptive right. For even
if this contention is granted, the right of anticipatory self-defense must still be
limited at least by the Caroline factors of necessity and proportionality, if not
in an even more restrained fashion.71
Particularly under these limiting factors, anticipatory self-defense would
seem an inapposite and unworkable principle in the context of the PSI. The
entire thrust of the principles underlying the PSI is a preventive one-to
preclude the acquisition of potentially dangerous technologies by states and
non-state actors. There has never been expressed by proponents of the PSI an
understanding of an imminence of threat from particular foreign target vessels
which under the Caroline formula would trigger even the customary right of
anticipatory self-defense on the part of interdicting states.
Preventive self-defense may be described as an attack against another
state (or in the PSI context, a vessel under the jurisdiction and flag of another
state) farther back along the ex ante chronological line-when a threat is
feared or suspected, but there is no evidence that materialization of the threat
is imminent. The doctrine was never a part of either moral or legal rights
argumentation in the classical period. It finds no foundation as a principle of
customary international law in modem times, and any attempt to justify this
extreme interpretation of a right includable in the legal concept of the right of
self-defense by reference to the U.N. Charter is a clear exercise in futility.
Admittedly, this is a difficult area, in which significant tensions exist
between current international legal principles as described above and what
many feel is a set of modem security realities that has made effective
regulation of international uses of force by reference to those principles both
practically and politically unfeasible. Although this is an interesting and
important debate, and one that will likely shape international use-of-force law
going forward, it cannot be done justice here. In the present examination, the
current status of international law must be employed for the purpose of legal
analysis, as it is the normative foundation currently binding upon states in
their policy considerations.
The point of the current discussion is that the right of states to self-
defense is not sufficient to act as a broad justifying principle for the PSI. The
sort of preventive right that would be necessary for the task is not found in
modem international law regulating the use of force. Moreover, law exists on
that are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well
established in customary international law. Moreover, a definition of the "armed attack"
which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the "inherent right" of self-defence, is
not provided in the Charter, and is not part of treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that
Article 51 is a provision which "subsumes and supervenes" customary international law.
It rather demonstrates that in the field in question . . . customary international law
continues to exist alongside treaty law.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27). However, while
standing for the principle that custom influences Charter interpretation for U.N. members in this area,
the ICJ's opinion in Military and Paramilitary Activities does not establish a rule for circumstances in
which there is a clear conflict between custom and treaty law. In such a situation, it could still be argued
that the treaty constitutes a special and separate regime and that for treaty signatories a conflict between
treaty law and customary law must be resolved in favor of the treaty rule.
71. On the principles of necessity and proportionality in customary international law, see
BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 257-64.
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the particular subjects at issue that is both lex specialis and lex posteri, and
that therefore takes priority as a governing legal framework. 72 The
international law of the sea-specifically the 1958 Geneva Conventions, 73 the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention), 74 and related custom-
addresses in a much more focused manner the rights and duties of both coastal
states and seagoing vessels, including aircraft, and provides concrete and
developed provisions regarding interdiction of foreign vessels. It is within the
parameters of this body of law, and not the law of self-defense generally, that
the PSI must be legitimized, if at all.
B. The Law of the Sea
Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the
establishment of the principle of state sovereignty as a geopolitical paradigm,
states have jealously guarded and defended the right to be the sole source of
legal prescription over their subject territory and to rule legitimately within
their borders without the interference of outside authorities. 75 Within this
sphere of entitlement, international law has come to classify state authority as
near-absolute and exclusionary. This classification applies not only to the land
territory of a state but also to its internal waters (e.g., rivers, bays, harbors),
with extremely limited exceptions. 76 In recognition of this authority,
international law does not accord foreign ships a general right of access to a
state's ports. States have a wide authority to prescribe conditions regulating
entry to ports and may close ports to all international trade, if they so desire.
Once a foreign vessel has entered a state's port, it surrenders itself to the
territorial jurisdiction of the state; the state may enforce its national laws upon
the ship and with respect to those on board, subject to the normal
considerations of diplomatic and sovereign immunities that most often come
into play in the case of warships.
77
Along with a state's rights to control its land and internal waters, it
quickly became generally accepted that states also had rights to control the sea
area directly adjacent to their territory. For centuries, however, international
law determined both the breadth of the sea area to which this right of control
attached and the precise nature of states' juridical competence over it. In time,
a legal distinction was drawn between the territorial sea directly adjacent to a
state's coastline and the sea area farther away from its coast. The breadth of
72. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 901 (5th ed. 1998) ("The
1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Article 110(1), makes no provision for jurisdiction over vessels on the
high seas on the basis of self-defense.").
73. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311;
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17
U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
74. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter LOS Convention].
75. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY 3-42 (1999).
76. See LEO JOSEPH BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1963);
MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 327-73 (1962).
77. See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 61-62 (3d ed. 1999).
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the territorial sea was eventually determined to extend up to twelve miles from
the baseline, 78 and all sea area farther than twelve miles out came to be
considered part of the high seas, or international waters, subject to an entirely
different regime of legal prescriptions with much greater limitations on the
authority of states to unilaterally regulate.79
I. Sources
First, a note on the sources of international law in this area is due. The
law of the sea is one of the oldest areas of international law. The history of
normative regulation of the sea lanes stretches back to medieval
pronouncements of rules governing maritime commerce found in collections
such as the Consolato del mare and the English Black Book of the Admiralty.s8
The evolution of international legal principles in this area has continued
through to modern times, and in the twentieth century it has found codified
expression in a number of significant multilateral treaties as well as through
the rule-generating processes of customary international law.
81
In terms of treaty law, the 1958 Geneva Conventions--consisting of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, the Convention on the
High Seas, and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (Territorial Sea Convention)--were a landmark achievement of
international regulation of the world's seas in terms of comprehensiveness of
both subject matter covered and number of signatories. 82 The increasing
presence in the United Nations of newly independent states that had had no
say in the drafting of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, particularly in the area of
national authority to regulate the sea bed, however, led to initiatives in
subsequent decades to amend the law contained in the 1958 conventions. Thus
in 1970, General Assembly Resolution 2750 called for a U.N. conference to
produce a new, comprehensive convention on the law of the sea.83
The result of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was the signing in 1982 of the LOS Convention.8 4 The number of states party
to the convention currently stands at 157, including almost all of the major
78. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S. WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 102-03 (1992).
79. See LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 3; BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 180-81.
80. See R.P. ANAND, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 2-3 (1983).
81. On the history, evolution, and guiding principles of the international law of the sea, see
generally id.; DEREK BOWETr, LAW OF THE SEA (1967); E.D. BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA (1994); C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (6th ed. 1967); A HANDBOOK
ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA (Ren6-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991); THOMAS WEMYSS
FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911); McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 76; 1-2 D.P.
O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (I.A. Shearer ed., 1984); SHIGERU ODA,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA (1979); J.R.V. PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD (1985); H.A. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA (1959);
JAMES C.F. WANG, OCEAN POLITICS AND LAW (1992).
82. Geneva Conventions, supra note 73.
83. G.A. Res. 2750, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 26, U.N. Doc. 28/A/8028
(1970).
84. LOS Convention, supra note 74.
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seagoing nations of the world.8 5 For signatories of both the 1958 Geneva
Conventions and the LOS Convention, the latter takes preeminence by its
terms.
8 6
However, important to discussions regarding the United States and its
obligations under the international law of the sea is the somewhat anomalous
fact that, while a signatory of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the United States
has never acceded to the LOS Convention. As previously noted, the main
differences between the 1958 Geneva Conventions and the LOS Convention
regard the regulation of the deep sea bed, and indeed, it is this sensitive issue
area that has prevented the United States from signing the 1982 treaty.8 7 The
two legal regimes, however, are virtually identical on matters of the right of
innocent passage and interdiction, rendering this anomaly irrelevant to the
aims of this Article. With respect to areas in which the treaty regimes do
differ, it is important to note that the 1982 LOS Convention has arguably, and
quite likely, passed in its entirety into customary international law, thereby
binding the United States to its provisions.
88
2. Territorial Sea
Over the area of the territorial sea, states have asserted, and international
law has come to recognize, the essential extension of state sovereignty beyond
land territory. 89 The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention expresses this
understanding:
The sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a
belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea.
This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of these articles and to other rules
85. See United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, at http://www.-
un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/conventionoverview-convention.htm (last updated Jan. 5,
2005).
86. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 311.
87. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 237.
88. Id. at 24.
89. See id. at 71-101; see also FULTON, supra note 81, at 537-58 (discussing the development
of Great Britain's claims to its territorial waters); P.C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND
MARITIME JURISDICTION 115-208 (1927) (analyzing the validity of sovereignty over territorial waters);
J.K. OUDENDIJK, STATUS AND EXTENT OF ADJACENT WATERS (1970); J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W.
SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d ed. 1996); Philip Allott,
Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 79, 80 (1971); W.E.
Butler, Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 331, 335-39 (1987) (discussing Soviet legislation implementing the LOS Convention's
provisions); P.T. Fenn, Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 465 (1926); Erik
Franckx, The U.S.S.R. Position on the Issue of Innocent Passage of Warships Through Foreign
Territorial Waters, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 33 (1987) (noting the limitation on state sovereignty imposed
by the right of innocent passage); L.T. Lee, Jurisdiction over Foreign Merchant Ships in the Territorial
Sea: An Analysis of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1961)
(discussing the validity of exercising sovereign power over merchant ships in territorial waters); D.P.
O'Connell, The Juridical Status of the Territorial Sea, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 303, 304 (1971) (noting,
with reference to the LOS Convention, that "[t]he function of international law is not to invest States
with legal regimes but to secure recognition of regimens contrived by action of individual members");
D.R. Rothwell, Coastal State Sovereignty and Innocent Passage: The Voyage of the Lusitania Expresso,
16 MARINE POL'v 427 (1992) (discussing Indonesia's attempt to assert its sovereignty to prevent the
passage of the Lusitania Expresso through its territorial waters).
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of international law.
90
The most significant principle compromising the sovereignty of states
over their territorial sea is the right of innocent passage, as that concept
developed both in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and in other sources of
international law. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea is limited to sea vessels and does
not extend to aircraft in the space above the territorial sea. Due to the danger
to states inherent in the abilities of aircraft to travel and maneuver at high
speed and avoid detection, no right of innocent passage, either over a state's
land territory or the territorial sea, has ever been conceded. Over aircraft in
these areas, therefore, state sovereignty is at its apex.
91
However, a right of innocent passage through territorial waters has long
been maintained for sea vessels and has achieved the status of a legal
entitlement in international law. This passage principle has evolved to include
both direct passage through the territorial sea and passage with the intent of
anchoring at port, inasmuch as that anchoring is incident to normal navigation
or trade, or to force majeure.
92
The concept of innocence as an element of this right has been more
complicated in its evolution. During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the concept of innocence in passage through the territorial sea was
thought to refer primarily to the disposition of the passage relative to the
national law of the state having sovereignty over the territorial sea: innocence
was lost when the laws of the coastal state were violated.93 The 1930 Hague
Conference adopted a text that loosened this strict tie to national law:
"Passage is not innocent when a vessel makes use of the territorial sea of a
coastal state for the purpose of doing any act prejudicial to the security, to the
public policy or to the fiscal interests of that state." 94 While not requiring a
breach of national law for innocence to be lost, this provision did require some
act on the part of the vessel, other than the mere act of passage, for a loss of
innocence to occur.95 The International Law Commission's 1956 draft articles
essentially adopted this view.
9 6
The commission's draft article on innocent passage was not accepted at
the 1958 conference, however, and Article 14(4) of the Territorial Sea
Convention was constructed to read: "[P]assage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Such
passage shall take place in conformity with these articles and with other rules
90. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 73, art. 1.
91. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, ch. 4.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The Legal Status of the Territorial Sea, League of Nations Doc. C.351(b) M.145(b), art. 3
(1930), reprinted in 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 1415 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1975) (1930).
95. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 83.
96. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 272, U.N. Doc. A/3159; see also Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9)
(discussing the concept of innocent passage).
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of international law." 97 In their seminal work on the law of the sea, Churchill
and Lowe comment on this provision:
This final text, which seems to be consistent with the actual practice of states, and so with
customary law, clearly does not require the commission of any particular act, or violation
of any law, before innocence is lost. Nor does violation of a coastal law necessarily
remove innocence, unless the violation actually prejudices coastal interests.
98
The 1982 LOS Convention added to this relatively vague provision of
the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. Article 19 of the LOS Convention
incorporates the text of Article 14(4) into its first paragraph. In its second
paragraph, however, Article 19 goes on to provide that "passage of a foreign
ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal state, if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities," 99 proceeding to list, inter alia: weapons practice; spying;
propaganda; launching or taking on board aircraft or military devices;
embarking or disembarking persons or goods contrary to customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary regulations; and interference with coastal
communication or other facilities. Article 19 then lists two broader additions
to this list:
Article 19(2)
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal state, or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; ...
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
10
The addition of a delineated list of activities was intended to add
objectivity to determinations regarding this right and to make such judgments
less open to interpretation by the coastal state.10 1 As drafted, it appears to
condition loss of innocence on some action or activity over and above mere
passage. However, in the absence of language explicitly rebutting the
presumption, the list must be interpreted as non-exhaustive. Moreover, the
retention of the 1958 language in the first paragraph indicates that passage
alone may justify interdiction, after all.10 2 In particular, Article 19(2)(a) is
arguably wide enough to include threats of force against states other than the
coastal state. 103
Interestingly, the question of the import of the activities listed in Article
19 of the LOS Convention was addressed in a bilateral treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union in 1989. Paragraph 3 of the Uniform
Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage
97. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 73, art. 14(4).
98. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 85.
99. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 19(2).
100. Id. art. 19(2)(a)-(1).
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states that "Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an
exhaustive list of activities that would render passage not innocent. A ship
passing through the territorial sea that does not engage in any of those
activities is in innocent passage." 104 While the binding weight of this
interpretive declaration is certainly confined to the two treaty parties, its
influence on customary international law is likely to be significant.'
05
As the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention states in Article 16(1), in a
provision echoed by Article 25(1) of the 1982 LOS Convention, once
innocence is lost, so too is the right of innocent passage, and the foreign vessel
is at that point subject to the full sovereignty of the coastal state, which may
arrest the vessel for breach of its national laws.' 06
3. The Exclusive Economic Zone
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a fairly recent concept in the
law of the sea, and it represents a compromise of sorts reached among those
states that desired a territorial sea extending 200 miles from the coastal
baseline and those states that were wary of the extension of state sovereignty
over so vast an area. 1 07 The EEZ is something of a hybrid between the
classical concepts of the territorial sea and the high seas, and it can be claimed
by states in an area not to exceed 200 miles beginning at the twelve-mile
territorial sea mark. As regards the freedom of navigation, which is most
pertinent to the discussion and analysis here, Article 58 of the LOS
Convention, describing this freedom in the EEZ context, brings the
convention regime into almost complete harmony with corresponding
provisions regarding freedom of navigation, including aircraft overflight, on
the high seas and indeed references those high seas provisions. 10 8 Thus for the
purposes of this treatment, the areas of the EEZ-with the EEZ including the
contiguous zone, if any-and the high seas will be considered subject to the
same legal regime.
104. Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, Sept.
23, 1989, U.S.-U.S.S.R., para. 3, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 25, 26 (Nov. 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1444,
1446 (1989).
105. CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 77, at 6.
106. Id. at 87.
107. On the Exclusive Economic Zone, see generally DAVID JOSEPH AwtARD, THE EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-31 (1987); CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 161-80;
BARBARA KwiATKowsKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 19-
24 (1989); E.D. Brown, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Criteria and Machinery for the Resolution of
International Conflicts Between Different Users of the EEZ, 4 MARITIME POL'Y & MGMT. 325 (1977);
William T. Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and the Contemporary Law of the
Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 289, 290 (1981) (noting that state claims with respect to the EEZ
"sometimes depart significantly from the negotiating texts produced in the LOS conference or any other
indication of shared expectations about coastal authority"); Jonathan 1. Charney, The Exclusive
Economic Zone and Public International Law, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 233 (1985) (stating that the
EEZ "in public international law is at a formative stage of development"); Lawrence Juda, The Exclusive
Economic Zone and Ocean Management, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305, 306 (1987) (claiming that
states with an established EEZ are now "turning to the matter of implementation"); Bernard H. Oxman,
An Analysis of the Exclusive Economic Zone as Formulated in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text,
in LAW OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION 57-78 (Thomas A. Clingan, Jr.
ed., 1982).
108. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 58.
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4. The High Seas
As previously mentioned, since the recognition of a legal delineation
between the territorial sea (and later the EEZ) and the sea area beyond, two
quite different legal regimes have evolved to govern the two separate areas.I°9
Most noteworthy is the fact that "[t]he legal concept of the high seas includes
not only the water column but also the superadjacent airspace as well as the
sea bed and subsoil subject."' 1 0 The legal regime governing the high seas has
classically been defined by its primary emphasis on the principles of freedom
of universal usage and exclusivity of jurisdiction over vessels of the flag
state.111 The dominance of these principles in the high seas regime stands in
marked contrast to the character of legal regulation of the territorial sea
discussed earlier and indicates a significant decrease in the authority of states
over foreign vessels. This decrease reflects a historical recognition of the
importance to all seagoing states of an ordered system of regulation of the
high seas to assure unmolested commerce and transit over the vast expanses of
water that cover two-thirds of the globe. It is a subject to which states have
traditionally granted special accord, in recognition of the inability of any one
state to police so large an area unilaterally and the consequent reliance of
states on mutual good faith in upholding the principles of law laid down in
treaties and customary practice.
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 LOS Convention
share largely identical provisions outlining the high seas legal regime.' 3 For
the purposes of the present discussion of the PSI, Article 92 of the LOS
Convention is perhaps the most noteworthy of these provisions. It stipulates
that "[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one state only and, save in exceptional
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention,
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas."' 14 Generally, the
109. On the high seas regime and related issues, see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at
203-22; NICHOLAS GRIEF, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AIRSPACE OF THE HIGH SEAS 8 (1994)
(noting that "the airspace above territorial waters and the airspace of the high seas are subject to very
different legal regimes"); Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist
Activities, in MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-11 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1990); 1
O'CONNELL, supra note 81, at 18-20; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 719-825 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); NICHOLAS M. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-98 (1969); C.H. Alexandrowicz, Freitas versus Grotius, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 162 (1959) (discussing Freitas' response to Grotius' Mare liberum); Barbara Kwiatkowska, Creeping
Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice,
22 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 153 (1991) (discussing the conditions under which states may exceed the
200-mile jurisdiction limit); Emanuel Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International
Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955) (discussing the relationship between hydrogen bomb experiments and
freedom of the seas); Ted L. McDorman, Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law and the U.N.
High Seas Fisheries Conference, 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. 531, 531 (1994) (noting that stateless vessels
constitute an international law problem only while on the high seas because "within the 200 nautical
mile zone the adjacent coastal State has unquestioned authority to deal with all vessels engaged in
fishing activities"); I.A. Shearer, Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement Against Delinquent
Vessels, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 320, 336-39 (1986).
110. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 203-04.
111. Id. at 203.
112. Id.at203-08.
113. Compare Convention on the High Seas, supra note 73, arts. 6, 11, 27-29, with LOS
Convention, supra note 74, arts. 92, 97, 113-15.
114. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 92.
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rule of exclusive jurisdiction in the flag state of a vessel is binding and
applicable in the context of both legislative and enforcement jurisdiction.' 15
However, this exclusivity of jurisdiction is not absolute. Exceptions to this
broad norm, under which other states may share jurisdiction over a vessel with
its flag state and may under that jurisdiction exercise authority to visit the
vessel-that is, to interdict its passage by arresting and boarding it-are listed
in detail in Article 110 of the LOS Convention.' The LOS Convention lists
these exceptions explicitly and exhaustively, in contrast to its treatment of the
freedoms alluded to in Article 87117:
Article 110
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship... is not justified in
boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that ....
The Article proceeds to list five grounds of suspicion that can trigger the
further procedures laid out for verification of the vessel's right to fly its flag
and, potentially, for a search of the ship. Interestingly, Article 110 does not
explicitly grant to an interdicting state the right of subsequent arrest or
detention of a vessel, nor seizure of its cargo, even if its suspicions of listed
activity are confirmed. This omission is consistent with the title of Article
110, which is conspicuously termed Right of Visit. Particular note should also
be taken of Article 110(4), which states that "[t]hese provisions apply mutatis
mutandis to military aircraft."'"19
The five listed grounds for suspicion are the following: the vessel's
engagement in piracy; engagement in the slave trade; engagement in
unauthorized broadcasting; being without nationality; or a case in which
"through flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship."'120 Of these grounds, only two
are even colorable candidates for providing a basis for interdiction in a
situation in which PSI-related objectives are being pursued-piracy and being
without nationality (the "stateless ship" exception).
There has been some mention of attempts to expand the notion of piracy
to cover activities related to WMD trafficking.1 21 While it would certainly be
helpful for the prosecution of PSI principles to have such activities covered by
the established law on piracy, the issue is in fact deserving of little attention
due to the total implausibility of this effort. Piracy is a long-standing offense
under international law and has received a vast amount of treatment both in
115. CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 77, at 208.
116. Id. at209-10.
117. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 87 (providing for the freedoms of navigation,
overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands and other
installations permitted under international law, fishing, and scientific research).
118. Id. art. 110.
119. Id. art. 110(4).
120. Id. art. 1.
121. Wade Boese, The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 11, 2003, at 37 available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/PSI.asp.
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legal sources and in academic literature. 122 It is defined explicitly in Article 15
of the Convention on the High Seas and Article 101 of the LOS Convention.
The definition of piracy in these sources, with LOS Convention Article 101 as
the operative source for the Article 110 right of interdiction, in no way permits
the sort of interpretive freedom necessarily wielded in attempts to include
within the offense of piracy the simple shipment of WMD-related materials
and technology without some additional act to bring the case under this
established rubric. 123
Second, and more significantly, much attention has been given to the
possibility of using the stateless ship exception in Article 110 as a basis for
interdictions under the PSI framework. 124 Into this stateless category are
assimilated unflagged vessels, vessels that have either had their right to sail
under a particular flag revoked or had their desired flag unrecognized, and
vessels that sail under two or more flags, changing them according to
convenience.1 25 Of such stateless ships, Churchill and Lowe have written:
Ships without nationality are in a curious position. Their "statelessness" will not, of itself,
entitle each and every State to assert jurisdiction over them, for there is not in every case
any recognised basis upon which jurisdiction could be asserted over stateless ships on the
high seas .... [I]t has been held, for example .... that such ships enjoy the protection of
no State, the implication being that if jurisdiction were asserted no State would be
competent to complain of a violation of international law. Widely accepted as this view
is, it ignores the possibility of diplomatic protection being exercised by the national State
of the individuals on such stateless ships. The better view appears to be that there is a
need for some jurisdictional nexus in order that a State may extend its laws to those on
122. See, e.g., BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 2 (1980)
(noting that only in the twentieth century was piracy "framed within an international convention on the
law of the sea"); Ronzitti, supra note 109, at 1-2; ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY (1988) (tracing
the development of the concept of piracy from ancient times through the twentieth century); 1 T.A.
WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 41, 118, 164 (1899); Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on
the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 269, 272-91 (1988). For current treaty law, see also Convention and Protocol from the International
Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10,
1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) [hereinafter Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts].
123. Article 101 of the LOS Convention provides:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:
i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft;
ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with the knowledge of facts making it a pirate-ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).
LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 101. Clearly, the mere act of transporting WMD-related materials
in no way satisfies the above definition.
124. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, "Legitimacy" in International Affairs: The American
Perspective in Theory and Operation, Remarks to the Federalist Society, at
http://www.state.gov/t/us/nn/26143.htm (Nov. 13, 2003).
125. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 213-14; H. MEIJERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS
309-23 (1967); Ted L. McDorman, Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law and the U.N. High Seas
Fisheries Conference, 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. 531 (1994).
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board a stateless ship and enforce the laws against them.
1 26
In the context of the PSI, it is conceivable that an arguable assertion of
such a jurisdictional link might be made, as it has been in the context of drug
trafficking, of the severity of the threat produced by the activity, and that in a
case in which a ship meets the criteria for statelessness, interdictions and
inspections could be conducted under the authority of LOS Convention
Article 110. Again, however, the issues of further detention, arrest, and
confiscation of goods are not clarified by Article 110 and are only clarified
with regard to verified pirate vessels in other articles of the LOS Convention
and the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which allow for their seizure and
for the prosecution of individuals on board suspected of piracy.
12 7
Other than through this described process of establishing a jurisdictional
link in the context of the assertion of a right of interdiction of stateless ships,
however, nothing in LOS Convention Article 110 justifies interdictions of
vessels on the high seas for the purposes contemplated by the PSI. In fact, as
previously stated, Article 110 is explicitly exhaustive of the bases for
interdiction on the high seas and thus creates a significant legal stumbling
block to any assertion of authority to interdict foreign ships and aircraft under
the PSI.
VI. LEGALITY OF ACTIONS PURSUANT TO THE PSI
Having reviewed the relevant principles of international law in the areas
of both use-of-force law and the law of the sea, this Article now turns to a
more targeted examination of the principles of the PSI-as laid out in the
Statement of Interdiction Principles released by the United States 128 and in
other statements by officials involved in the PSI-and to the legality of
actions to be taken in pursuance thereof. To begin with, it must be noted that
the scope and character of the actions contemplated under the PSI framework
remain unclear. For example, some statements, particularly by former then-
Under-Secretary Bolton, have seemed to indicate that the PSI could include
interdictions of vessels believed to be carrying WMD-related materials on the
high seas. 129 Other iterations of the policy parameters of the PSI, such as the
above-referenced unclassified version of the Statement of Interdiction
Principles, have conspicuously avoided reference to interdiction on the high
seas (although not ruling out the possibility), focusing instead on interdiction
efforts within states' land territory, internal waters, and territorial sea. In light
of these contradictory statements, and the further fact, as noted previously,
that most interdictions will not be reported for public response and critique,
this Section will proceed to consider possibilities for the interdiction of
vessels in transit through the entire range of possible legal regimes, from areas
of clear state territorial jurisdiction out to and including the high seas.
126. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 214 (internal citation omitted).
127. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 73, arts. 19-21; LOS Convention, supra note 74,
arts. 105-07.
128. Press Release, Statement of Interdiction Principles, supra note 10.
129. Boese, supra note 121, at 37.
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A. State Territory
As previously discussed, within the territory of a state-including land
territory, internal waters, and superadjacent airspace-the state has virtually
complete jurisdiction both to legislate and to enforce.
1 30 Thus national laws
could be constructed at the discretion of national lawmaking bodies and in
accordance with constitutional or other national legal sources in order to
provide for interdictions of PSI-related suspect shipments in land, sea, or air
transit through these areas. This competence to legislate and enforce would of
course extend to any vessel, foreign or domestic, and to any foreign or
domestic national involved in these transactions, subject only to sovereign and
diplomatic immunity protections under international law. Up to this point
there is very little contention, and what legal questions exist are generally
related to the harmonization of such provisions with national foundational
legal authorities.
Also, as previously noted, states may prescribe conditions on entry to
their ports and airfields, including customs-related requirements for the
boarding and searching of vessels prior to entry, and for the seizure of items
the possession or importation of which is proscribed by national law. 131
Properly constructed national laws, therefore, could legitimize many PSI-
related interdictions of both domestic and foreign vessels and aircraft in transit
through areas of state territory.
B. Territorial Sea
As the scope of possible interdiction activities moves out beyond the
area of states' territorial jurisdiction to include interdictions within the
territorial sea, analysis of the legitimacy of those activities becomes more
complicated. Based on the principles of law previously reviewed, it should be
possible to construct national legal principles legitimizing coastal state
interdiction of both foreign and domestic aircraft in transit through airspace
over the coastal state's own territorial sea under the PSI framework without
running afoul of international law. It should also be possible through these
national legal sources to legitimize the seizure of goods made illegal by those
sources, which could include WMD-related items. Furthermore, it should be
possible for a coastal state to interdict seagoing vessels under its flag in its
own territorial sea as long as the principles creating such a right to interdict
are established in national legal sources. Seagoing vessels as well as aircraft
are of course subject to the jurisdiction of their flag state wherever they are
found.
The interdiction of foreign seagoing vessels in the territorial sea by a
coastal state, however, will necessitate either obtaining the consent of the flag
state to the interdiction or, in the absence of consent, overcoming those
vessels' right of innocent passage described above. Notwithstanding the
significant presumption of retention of the right of innocent passage, in the
final analysis, in the particular case of suspected WMD-proliferation
130. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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activities, this presumption would likely not present too great a hurdle for
coastal states to clear. As explained above, Article 19 of the LOS Convention
is subject to an interpretation that would allow a coastal state to deem the right
of innocent passage lost simply by virtue of the character of the passage of a
vessel through the territorial sea, and would not require some additional act by
the vessel for this purpose. 132 In the modem climate of concern regarding the
proliferation of WMD and the transit of WMD-related materials as threats to
the security of both the coastal state and--drawing upon the particular
language of Article 19-other states as well, it should be relatively
unproblematic for coastal states to legitimize overcoming the right of innocent
passage through their territorial waters of seagoing vessels regarding which
there is a reasonable basis to suspect involvement in these activities. Short of
an egregious abuse of this discretion, such a determination would likely not be
found in excess of a coastal state's rights to safeguard its security.
In a case in which the right of innocent passage has been lost, seagoing
vessels in the territorial sea are subject to the full legislative and enforcement
jurisdiction of the coastal state. As long as these principles are established in
national law, the arrest, boarding, searching, and seizure of illegal items found
on board, as well as the prosecution of crew members, should be possible for
the coastal state to legitimize under international law.
C. High Seas
The analysis thus far of the legality of actions contemplated under the
PSI should be relatively welcome to proponents of the program, as within the
full sovereignty zone and in the territorial sea area there should be fairly wide
latitude under international law for activities falling under the PSI's mandate.
However, this latitude essentially ceases when consideration turns to the high
seas and its relevant legal regime. As the foregoing analysis shows, states may
exercise their legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over both seagoing
vessels and aircraft flying under their flag on the high seas and thus practice
the principles of the PSI upon them, including boarding, searching, and
seizure of goods. States may also be able to use the principle of stateless
vessels to legitimize visitations (arrest and boarding) of aircraft and seagoing
vessels not flying their flag on the high seas. However, the right of a state to
effect a continuing arrest of the vessel or aircraft and to confiscate items found
under this entitlement is quite tenuous. 133
Other than in this latter class of cases, interdictions of foreign-flagged
vessels or aircraft on the high seas, unless sanctioned ex ante by the flag state,
are illegal under international law not only for members of the 1982 LOS
Convention but, due to the customary law status likely achieved by those
principles, for any state. The only available means of legally exempting
interdiction activities on the high seas from the relevant confines of Article
110 of the LOS Convention for signatories of the same would be to take
advantage of the Article's first clause: "[e]xcept where acts of interference
132. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
133. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 77, at 205-18. On the stateless ship exception, see
supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
The Proliferation Security Initiative
derive from powers conferred by treaty."' 134 Here the drafters of Article 110
wished to leave open the possibility that subsequent or already extant treaties
among groups of LOS Convention signatories might amend as among
themselves the right of interdiction covered in Article 110. Thus states upon
which the principles of the LOS Convention are legally binding can
essentially rewrite the interdiction principles of Article 110 pursuant to this
provision through the establishment of conflicting principles in other treaty
instruments.
This recognition has been the impetus behind recent efforts, particularly
on the part of the United States, to achieve consensus on amendments to the
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (ICSUA)131 to include in that instrument provisions
allowing for interdiction of vessels trafficking in weapons and WMD-related
goods. 1 6 Thus far, such efforts have met with little success. Even if these
efforts were successful, they would not necessarily remedy the problem of
legitimizing interdictions on the high seas. For an amendment of the ICSUA
to exempt a state from the strictures of Article 110 of the LOS Convention,
not only the interdicting state but also the target state (the flag state of the
interdicted vessel) would have to be a member of the ICSUA. 137 The only
other means of legitimizing high seas interdictions through the ICSUA,
although both practically and legally more questionable, would be for the
amended provision of the ICSUA to achieve the status of customary law in
derogation of both the treaty and parallel customary law of LOS Convention
Article 110.
Also under this clause, however, could arguably be included the
authorization and direction of interdictions by the U.N. Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as the Charter specifies in
Article 25 that all decisions of the Security Council including Chapter VII
resolutions are binding upon all Charter signatories138 and are thus arguably
member-state obligations or entitlements under a separate treaty framework.
Although the members of the PSI have up to the present declined to seek the
Security Council's support for the PSI, then-Under Secretary Bolton indicated
that Security Council action under Chapter VII could provide supplementary
authority for PSI-related actions in the future in cases in which sufficient
authority cannot be found elsewhere.
139
D. Chapter VII
In this context it bears brief mention that arguments that have been made
for the passing of a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII, essentially
establishing a legal framework for the PSI to be applied chronologically ad
infinitum and in whatever cases appear to match whatever standards might be
134. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 10.
135. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts, supra note 122.
136. Boese,supra note 121, at 37.
137. Intern'l Maritime Org., Conventions, Status of Conventions-Summary, at
http://www.imo.org/home.asp (last updated Mar. 31, 2005).
138. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
139. Boese, supra note 121, at 37.
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laid out in such a resolution, misunderstand the conception that body has
always had of its rightful exercise of authority. The U.N. Charter grants the
Security Council the authority and responsibility to "maintain [and] restore
international peace and security," and for that purpose it is granted the power
under the articles of Chapter VII to authorize member states to take forceful
action. 140 These powers have always been understood to be properly exercised
only to remedy breaches of international peace and threats to international
security that have already begun to take place or that appear imminent. The
Security Council has never taken upon itself the mantle of a legislative body,
setting up legal frameworks reference to which may justify international acts
of force in situations not specifically contemplated in the authorizing
resolutions. 41 In this context, it must be remembered that all members of the
United Nations are bound in the first instance by the broad non-intervention
obligation embodied in U.N. Charter Article 2(4). This Article, as well as
Article 2(7), establishes a clear presumption in favor of states' territorial
integrity and sovereignty. 142 The exceptions to this obligation provided for in
Chapter VII of the Charter must be made clear and explicit through a
resolution by the Security Council, and states must take care not to act beyond
the clear mandate provided by the relevant resolution, lest they run afoul of
Article 2(4). This assertion indeed is the chief argument in opposition to
recent efforts to legitimize the intervention in 2003 by Western powers in Iraq
on the basis of Security Council Resolution 678.43
However, temporary and ad hoc authorizations of force by the Security
Council under Chapter VII could, through Article 110 of the LOS Convention,
establish a legal basis for interdiction of particular vessels suspected of
trafficking in WMD-related materials. The process of obtaining such a
resolution, along with the attendant transaction costs of persuading a sufficient
number of Security Council members, including all permanent members, to
allow the measure to pass, is clearly not an attractive one for PSI participants,
particularly as time is of the essence after the detection of a suspect vessel.
This is not to mention the groaning among national intelligence agencies that
would accompany any proposal to share intelligence with a group as disparate
as the Security Council, as would be necessary to establish a reasonable basis
for belief of a target vessel's suspect activity and obtain the support of that
body for an interdiction. Thus the Security Council route, while an option for
legitimizing PSI interdictions on the high seas in the absence of authority
elsewhere, is not likely to be a mode of choice among PSI participants even
though they have few other authorities on which to rely.
140. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
141. Cf BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 663-65.
142. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 2(7); see Jochen A. Frowein, Unilateral Interpretation of
Security Council Resolutions-A Threat to Collective Security?, in LIBER AMICORUM GONTI-ER
JAENICKE-ZuM 85, 98 (Volkmar G6tz et al. eds., 1998).
143. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/678 (1990). But see
William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
557 (2003).
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E. Security Council Resolution 1540
Before moving on, it is important to note the most recent addition to the
corpus of international law operating in the area of WMD proliferation. On
April 28, 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1540.'4 The
resolution was approved-not coincidentally-shortly after the revelation in
February of that year of the existence of a long-standing clandestine nuclear
materials smuggling ring headed b the father of Pakistan's gas centrifuge
program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.'
41
In Resolution 1540, the Security Council undertook to address a number
of fundamental limitations of the existing nonproliferation treaties and
regimes system. The first is the problem of the non-universality of the system,
a result of the fact that all such treaties and regimes were traditionally adopted
only voluntarily by states, and that for a variety of reasons many states,
including some of significant proliferation concern, have elected to remain
outside the regime system. 146 A second major challenge to the
nonproliferation treaties and regimes system is the fact that all existing regime
restrictions on the manufacture, possession, and trafficking of weapons-related
technologies are addressed to states themselves. Thus at the international
level, there is no substantive restriction on the ability of private parties,
including business entities as well as other non-state actors, to engage in any
of these activities. The ability of non-state actors in many countries to engage
in WMID development programs and activities, essentially legally, can be seen
as a major shortcoming of the classical nonproliferation regime system.
Resolution 1540 addressed these challenges through the authority of the
Security Council under its Chapter VII power, binding upon every U.N.
member under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter. Through this legally binding
decision, the Security Council imposed additional continuing international
legal obligations on all U.N member states. The resolution addresses the non-
state actor problem described above in Operative Paragraph 1, which provides
that "all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery. 147 Furthermore, Operative Paragraph 2 provides:
[AIll States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire,
possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage
in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance
them.
148
144. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 53.
145. Gary Milhollin & Kelly Motz, Nukes "R' Us, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A29.
146. See Daniel H. Joyner, International Legal Responses to Weapons Proliferation, in
GLOBALIZATION AND VIOLENCE (Christopher Hughes & Richard Devetak eds., forthcoming 2005).
147. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 53, para. 1.
148. Id. para. 2.
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Operative Paragraph 3 goes on to impose an obligation on states to
establish and maintain effective export control laws and regulations at the
national level,
including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and
re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-
shipment such as financing... as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing
and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control
laws and regulations.
1 49
The passage of Security Council Resolution 1540 marks a significant
milestone in the development of international law on the subject of WMD
proliferation, and there is a great deal to be said by way of analysis of its
implications, not only for the substantive regulation of WMD proliferation but
also as an example of a marked drift in the jurisprudence of the Security
Council itself, following a trend begun with the passage of Resolution
1373.150 However, this Article will forebear from undertaking such a detailed
analysis. Interested readers are referred to the author's more complete analysis
of Resolution 1540 published elsewhere.'151
For the purposes of the present treatment, however, there is one further
significant provision of Resolution 1540 that has been argued by some to
represent additional or independent international legal authority for the
prosecution of the PSI. In Operative Paragraph 10, the Security Council "calls
upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and
legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to
prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their
means of delivery, and related materials."'
' 52
While at first blush Operative Paragraph 10 may seem to provide
additional legal support to the PSI, which was no doubt the intent of some of
the resolution's drafters, 153 its legal character can be distinguished from that of
Operative Paragraphs 1 through 3, where the Council "decides that all states
shall" take specific actions related to the regulation of WMD proliferation
within their domestic legal systems. 154 This language signifies that the
Council is exercising its Chapter VII authority to impose obligations on states
in their capacity as signatories of the U.N. Charter and to issue binding new
decisions on matters of both substance and procedure. In Operative
Paragraphs 4 through 7, the Council then further decides to establish a
committee to accept compliance reports from member states and takes other
149. Id. para. 3.
150. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Resolution 1373 represents the first time the
U.N. Security Council behaved more like a legislature than an executive, in that it codified long-
standing norms and commanded member states to enact domestic laws in compliance with those norms.
This contrasts with the Security Council's usual modus operandi-ad hoc, temporary authorization of
force. Resolution 1540 is another example of this shift in the Security Council's role. For a discussion of
Resolution 1373, see Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the
United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 593 (2003).
151. Joyner, supra note 146.
152. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 53, par. 10 (emphasis in original).
153. For a general discussion of interpretation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, see
Michael Byers, Agreeing To Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and International Ambiguity,
10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 165 (2004).
154. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 53, paras. 1-3 (emphasis in original).
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steps aimed at implementation. 155 However, in Operative Paragraphs 8
through 10, the Council only "calls upon" states to take much more ill-defined
and broadly termed action to counter the general threats of proliferation, 156 in
the manner of an exhortation to states made on behalf of the United Nations in
its capacity as an international organization, signifying a change in the legal
character of the text from obligation-imposing to invitation-making.
Thus the text of Operative Paragraph 10 does not bestow any additional
authority upon states to enforce the PSI and does not exempt states from any
international legal obligations they otherwise have. It is simply an invitation
from the U.N. Security Council to states to cooperate in efforts to combat
WMD proliferation in a manner consistent with existing domestic and
international laws.
VII. CONSIDERATIONS
At least two sets of questions are raised by the foregoing analysis of the
legality of actions contemplated under the PSI framework. The first has to do
with the soundness of proceeding against the threat of WMD proliferation
along the path outlined by the PSI, according to which legal efforts are
expended primarily on justifying interdictions of vessels thought to be
carrying WMD-relevant items in place of efforts to in fact make illegitimate
the transfer of the items themselves. In legal terms this reasoning is cart-
before-the-horse logic. Interdiction, under either domestic or international
law, is essentially an enforcement mechanism, not a substantive judgment on
the legality of the target activity. Thus LOS Convention Article 110 limits the
legitimate subjects for interdiction to those vessels engaged in only five
possible activities-activities that other sources of law make substantively
illegal. 1
57
The clearest example of this notion is found in the area of drug
trafficking-one of the activities listed for justifiable interdiction in Article
110. Drug trafficking on the high seas is an illegal activity under a number of
international conventions, most notably the 1988 Vienna Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which both
defines the activities covered under its proscriptive terms and lays out detailed
measures authorized for their suppression.158 Similarly, the crime of piracy is
defined in detail in Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas (Article 101
155. Id. paras. 4-7.
156. Id. paras. 8-10 (emphasis in original).
157. See note 119 and accompanying text.
158. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-4 (1989), 1582 U.N.T.S. 164; see also William C.
Gilmore, Drug Trafficking by Sea: The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 15 MARINE POL'Y 183 (1991). For discussions of
international efforts to combat drug traffic, see William C. Gilmore, Narcotics Interdiction at Sea: The
1995 Council of Europe Agreement, 20 MARINE POL'Y 3 (1996); William C. Gilmore, Narcotics
Interdiction at Sea: UK-US Cooperation, 13 MARINE POL'Y 218 (1989); John Siddle, Anglo-American
Cooperation in the Suppression of Drug Smuggling, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 726 (1982) (discussing the
exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding combating the drug
trade); J.D. Stieb, Survey of United States Jurisdiction over High Seas Narcotics Trafficking, 19 GA. J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 119 (1989) (discussing the 1986 Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act).
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of the LOS Convention) and Article 3 of the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. 1
59
Analogous sources address the illegality under international law of other
activities subject to interdiction actions in LOS Convention Article 110.160
The LOS Convention is therefore best read narrowly as simply providing non-
flag states the legal justification under some circumstances for interdiction of
these already illegal activities.
Trafficking in WMD-related items and technology, however, is an
entirely different matter. Here the answer to the counterproliferation question
of interdiction in fact depends on the substantive legality of transfers of such
items between states, which of course leads directly back to the discussion
above on the existing nonproliferation treaties and regimes framework. 161 As
seen in that discussion, with few exceptions there is very little hard or formal
international law not only on the question of transfers of nuclear, chemical,
and biological materials, agents, and compounds and the associated myriad
dual-use items and technologies that could be used to turn those materials into
weaponized devices, but even more fundamentally on the question of the
possession of such technologies. What rules that exist are as a general matter
quite vague, at a level prohibitive of effective application to particular fact
situations, and are given some specificity only in the norms of multilateral
export control regimes, which are non-binding under international law. 162
Even the newest source of international nonproliferation law, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1540, only binds U.N. member states to establish laws in
their domestic jurisdictions regulating sensitive exports and the behavior of
non-state actors with regard to sensitive items and technologies, and to deny
those actors state support. This resolution does establish international legal
obligations for states, although it is not clear exactly what those obligations
are with regard to direct and official state transfers of WMD-related items and
technologies. These obligations may in fact not be covered by domestic export
controls, which are as a rule focused on regulating exports by private parties
and can generally be overridden by state policy imperatives. However, even
more poignantly, non-state actor behavior is still not made the subject of
international legal coverage such as to give rise to breaches of international
law by private parties engaging in WMD-related materials transfer.
These facts beg the implementation question of which shipments would
be the focus of PSI efforts. Would shipments from all countries or only a
select few be candidates for interdiction? Similarly, information on transfers
of which items and technologies would trigger a reasonable suspicion of
illegitimate sensitive items transfer? In the absence of objectively verifiable
law on the subject, according to what standard would such determinations be
made? Perhaps most importantly, who would make these determinations? In
fact the very same considerations that have bedeviled efforts to treat the
159. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text on piracy.
160. See, e.g., European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations
Outside National Territories, Jan. 22, 1965, 634 U.N.T.S. 239; Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46
Stat. 2183, 60 U.N.T.S. 253. On stateless vessels, see supra notes 109, 124-126
161. See supra Section IV.B.1.
162. On export controls, see supra note 34.
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subject of WMD-related materials transfer through the nonproliferation treaty
and regimes system with specificity and objectivity are the same
considerations that make these questions in the PSI context unanswerable,
except to reply that such determinations would be made either unilaterally or
in consultation with a small number of other PSI participants and on no
objective international legal basis whatsoever.
As a domestic law analogy, imagine a statute authorizing police forces
to stop and search all automobiles traveling on public roads that are suspected
of carrying children to soccer practice, and providing for the seizure of all
athletic equipment found in the vehicle. The reverse logic in this hypothetical
of sanctioning interdictions of substantively legal activities is readily apparent.
The application to the PSI context is of course that while trafficking in WVIMD-
related items and technologies is perhaps more sinister than the conduct
described above, in many cases it is in fact no more illegal under relevant law
and therefore as illustrative of corrupted logic in the establishment of
interdiction principles. In the domestic context, such enforcement action upon
activity not substantively illegal would likely be in breach of constitutional or
other foundational protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and
would constitute a failure to accord due process of law to the subject of the
enforcement action. These rights of course do not exist in a general sense in
international law, and certainly not in the particular context of the commercial
transit of goods under the law of the sea. Still, the presence of such analogous
protections under the domestic legal frameworks of most liberal democratic
states (i.e., as general principles of law) might bolster arguments made by a
target of PSI interdiction activities before an international tribunal about the
illegitimate character of such activities under LOS Convention Article 110.163
This observation of the logic and jurisprudential correctness of having
norms on substantive illegality precede norms on interdiction tends to support
arguments for the strengthening of nonproliferation norms as a matter of great
priority and shared emphasis with modem counterproliferation efforts, both in
the context of nonproliferation regimes themselves and also as a foundation
upon which to build counterproliferation programs.
The second set of questions goes to the utility of the PSI as a policy
matter but has bearing on the legal questions discussed above. The
fundamental inquiry is whether there is sufficient utility in the potential
operation of the PSI to justify such theoretical difficulties in enforcement as
well as potential destabilization, particularly of the high seas regime, through
overly virulent or even abusive application of PSI interdiction principles.
As described above, established rules of international law all but prohibit
PSI interdictions of vessels on the high seas by non-flag states.164 These rules
then leave open the possibility of negotiating ex ante boarding agreements
with flag states, though such agreements are likely to require the expenditure
of a great deal of political capital and will likely be achieved only with states
that are not of great proliferation concern. The rules also leave some rights in
163. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 993 ("The Court... shall apply... the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.").
164. See supra Section V.
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coastal states, as discussed, regarding both flag and non-flag vessels in the
territorial sea and, of course, enforcement actions in state territory. The
question must therefore be asked: Of what utility is the new initiative if its aim
is significantly to decrease international shipments of WMD-related items and
technologies by or to states of proliferation concern?
In this context, it is important to note that transfers of completed
weapons systems of the type seen in the case of the So San are quite
exceptional and do not fairly represent what are the most commonly used
modes of sensitive technology transfer as well as (at the same time) the most
difficult ones to combat. A generalized statement can be made to the effect
that the greatest facilitator of WMD development programs in the nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons context is not single-use items-fissile
materials, poisonous chemicals, or dangerous biological agents. Rather, the
greatest concern is the transfer to states of the means of indigenous production
of these materials as well as the technology to turn them into WMD. For this
purpose, dual-use goods of a wide variety, ranging from aluminum tubes to
microscopes to machine tools, are both requisite to obtain and increasingly
difficult to regulate on both the national and multilateral level. The
international transfer of such items and the proliferation threat caused thereby
are not most effectively targeted through principles of interdiction in transit.
They are rather better addressed through the developed and maturing system
of multilateral export controls, which aims to coordinate the national export
control systems of member supplier states in their comprehensive regulation
of dual-use items and technologies export.
It is true that the problem of secondary proliferation is not well
addressed through the existing structure of multilateral export control regimes
and associated proliferation treaty instruments. Proponents of the PSI will also
argue that even if interdictions cannot legally be staged against all ships, there
is utility in the program in that it may force proliferators to use only ships
under the flag of non-PSI participants for proliferation activities, thus
potentially raising transaction costs. They may point as well to the potential
deterrent effect upon commercial shipping companies which even a limited
number of interdictions would have, motivating such actors to increase their
diligence in acquiring information on car o and creating a disincentive to
enter into questionable freight contracts. The marginal utility of these
possible effects is not denied. However, the question is again raised: In a
reality of scarce resources, both physical and political, are gaps in the
nonproliferation regime better addressed through resource allocation to an
interdiction program, the principles and motivations of which are likely to
give rise to actions of questionable legality in an area of law of great
importance to international order, and which is to be prosecuted among a
handful of states whose territorial waters, state territory, and boarding
agreement coalitions could be fairly easily avoided by savvy and determined
smugglers? Or, might gaps be better addressed through an increased emphasis
on, and resource allocation to, additional nonproliferation efforts such as
165. Telephone Interview with a senior official, U.S. Defense Dep't (Feb. 12, 2004) (on
condition of anonymity).
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export-control assistance programs, aid and development programs, and less
invasive counterproliferation programs such as the U.S. Commerce
Department's Container Security Initiative, pursuant to which U.S. Customs
officials are posted at a growing number of foreign ports-including
important transshipment points-with inspection powers granted by the host
government?
In point of fact, the PSI seems almost tailor-made to deal with only one
threat-the proliferation of missile technologies. There is, to be frank, only
one state that has consistently sold missiles to other states and actors requiring
delivery over long distances by sea. It is the same state of origin of the
missiles on board the So San. This is not to say that the threat posed by North
Korean proliferation of missile technologies is not a serious one. North Korea
is in possession of both short and medium range missiles, with further
development of ballistic missile capabilities reportedly advancing. 166 The
proliferation of such advanced delivery systems to states with WMD
development programs is clearly a legitimate concern for foreign-policy
makers of states that are potential targets of these technologies. As discussed
above, proliferation of missile technologies has been the issue area least
effectively addressed by export controls. 167 However, recognition of the
limited utility of the PSI to the missile proliferation threat from North Korea
does decrease in measure the justifiability of actions under the PSI framework
which violate settled principles of international law, and particularly
principles as vital to the ordered character of international commerce as those
under the umbrella of the law of the sea.
VIII. NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION REPRISED
Returning to the subject discussed at length above of the shift in some
influential states' policies toward counterproliferation programs and strategies
and a lessening emphasis on traditional nonproliferation efforts, the
observation is made that the PSI can be taken at least to some extent as a
representative case study that, while not of course comprehensively
exemplary, is useful in its illustration of a number of poignant distinctions
between the methodologies imperfectly differentiated above as falling into
these two categories. It further raises significant questions, sure to be
recurring as an understanding of the proper place of counterproliferation
principles in both national and international policies continues to be played
out, of the harmony of such policies, both in their specific application through
discrete methodologies and programs and also in their theoretical foundations,
with international law
Squaring nonproliferation efforts with international law has not
classically been problematic, due largely to the consensual nature of
international legal instruments and other normative regimes that form their
foundation and reference. And even nonproliferation-related sanctions
programs, while not usually consensual on the part of target states, have as a
166. See Monterey Inst. of Int'l Studies, Overview of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program,
at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
167. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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general rule been conducted under the auspices of international legal regimes,
most notably the U.N. Security Council, and have not been found to be in
breach of states' obligations under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter to refrain
from acts violating the "territorial integrity or political independence" of other
states.' 
68
Counterproliferation strategies, because of fundamental aspects of their
character, design, and purpose, are often much harder to square with
international law. 169 This observation includes not only the PSI but also the
larger issues of preemption discussed above. Counterproliferation tactics tend
generally to be more forceful, interventionist, and non-consensual. They also
tend to be carried out either unilaterally or by small coalitions, due in no small
part to the difficulties of intelligence-sharing among large numbers of diverse
partner states at the grade of sensitivity necessarily involved in the detection
of WMD-related materials possession or transfer. The question becomes how
to square this fact of disharmony with established international law and the
rules of international legal regimes with the fairly well-supported imperative
expressed by many, both within government and without, that despite its
virtues and successes, the current nonproliferation regime system is
ineffective at curbing WMD proliferation to a troubling degree. And even the
promised effectiveness of the less invasive strategy of economic sanctions-
which it should be noted has received a positive shot in the arm through recent
revelations of the crippled state of Iraqi WVMD development programs 
17 -
must be understood to be limited in its attractiveness as a policy option due to
its lengthy timetable and collateral damage to civilian economies and
infrastructure.1
71
As much as one-particularly if that one is an international lawyer-
attempts to avoid it, the observer is led down a path of analysis that almost
inescapably leads to the conundrum that, at least in reference to some of the
more modest and persuasively supported applications of counterproliferation
principles, a calculus must be employed by which the value of maintaining
compliance with international law must be set against the value of increasing
the effectiveness of efforts to stop WMD proliferation, where those are
mutually exclusive but sincerely desired outcomes.
In some cases as in the case of the PSI, the question seems to become
one of fairly limited marginal contribution to anti-proliferation efforts on one
hand as compared to the cost in terms of the strategy's rather considerable
potential violence to the substance of international law in an important area of
legal regulation and the consequences-likely more long-term than
immediate-flowing therefrom. Thus the relevance of the sort of utility
arguments discussed above in the PSI context. As here, where there cannot be
shown to be a significant marginal contribution to the international
community's efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD's, yet the danger of
either per se or potential abuse of settled and important provisions of
168. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
169. See supra Section V.
170. See George A. Lopez & David Cortright, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, FOREIGN
AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 90, 91.
171. Id. at 95.
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international law is great, this balance would seem to tilt away from the
supportability of the maintenance of such counterproliferation policies.
In other cases, such as in some of the better argued cases for propriety of
application of preemptive strike principles, there is a much stronger argument
to be made that an international legal right to act against WMD possession
and proliferation could be of significant strategic usefulness and national
security prudence for states that genuinely feel they are intended targets of
such weapons in the not distant future.' 72 This is a harder case as it is difficult
to argue against the legitimate interest of states to defend themselves under
circumstances of threat wildly altered from those obtaining in 1945 when
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter was written and accepted as a norm sufficient
to protect state interests and allowing of adequate measures of defense against
conventional attack by means in customary usage at the time. The WMD age,
however, particularly in its current advanced moment, has forced a very
different set of security realities upon states, and it is not unreasonable for
governments both to expect and to demand that international law recognize
this fact and give legitimacy to reasonable state actions done in consideration
of it.
This conclusion obviously leads directly to considerations of changing
current international law to reflect modem proliferation realities. And such
efforts may be both prudentially sound and even practically feasible in some
such persuasive cases, and worth the potentially immense political capital the
expenditure of which will be necessary to bring such changes about. However,
particularly poignant in this regard is the fact that it is very unclear whether a
system of international use-of-force law could possibly be developed that
would allow the kind of flexibility (including on issues of intelligence-sharing
mentioned above) that an effective preemption doctrine would require, while
keeping any semblance of an objectively verifiable rule of law in the
regulation of international uses of force.
Although the confines of the present examination will not permit a
thorough discussion of these important larger issues, in the present author's
opinion it is unclear whether we can much longer spare ourselves the rather
imposing question of whether it is possible to have in the modem "post-
proliferated" age a real and viable international use-of-force law system,
based upon rule-of-law principles, that yet legitimizes the kinds of actions that
would reasonably need to be allowed states in order to significantly increase
the effectiveness of international anti-proliferation efforts. 73 The author thus
agrees with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his judgment when
speaking of the proposed logic of preemption as a counterproliferation
strategy and the argued legitimacy of its prosecution by states acting
unilaterally or through ad hoc coalitions (i.e. outside the framework of the
United Nations.) In considering these proposals the Secretary General has
insightfully stated:
172. Israel's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 presents a compelling
case. See Louis Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 67.
173. See Daniel H. Joyner, The Future- of International Use of Force Law (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:507
This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however
imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last 58 years .... If it were to
be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and
lawless use of force, with or without justification .... But it is not enough to denounce
unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some states feel
uniquely vulnerable .... We must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed
effectively through collective action. We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a
moment no less decisive that 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.
174
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to provide a review of the Proliferation
Security Initiative and to address issues raised by its present and forthcoming
implementation through interdictive actions particularly targeting seagoing
vessels and aircraft. It has located the PSI in the context of efforts toward
nonproliferation and counterproliferation, as those concepts are defined to
distinguish activities and strategies aimed at combating the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. It has also conducted a review of principles of
international law relevant to the activities contemplated under the PSI
framework and has shown the limits of their permissibility. Finally it has
addressed certain jurisprudential and policy questions that arise from this
analysis and has offered some thoughts relative to the PSI as a representative
case study of differences in character and application of nonproliferation
versus counterproliferation strategies, including the current and future
relationship of counterproliferation strategies particularly with international
law.
It is hoped that the examination conducted herein will be of use both in
shaping understanding and opinion among observers in the international
community regarding the legitimacy and prudence of the PSI as a
counterproliferation measure, and possibly in aiding policymakers in their
consideration of larger issues of concern to proliferation specialists and
international lawyers alike.
174. What They Said in New York; Iraq, TIMES (London), Sept. 24,2003, at 17.
